Beginning in 1979, the Chinese government decided to implement the well-known—and highly controversial—one-child policy to try to confront, to the greatest extent possible, the problem of the country’s exponential population growth. The rule envisaged, as its name implies, the bearing of a single child with limited exceptions. In case of non-compliance, the consequences could range from loss of job or party membership to more extreme ones such as reproductive violence.
The one-child policy, however, is not the only measure that the Chinese Communist Party has adopted over the decades to address population growth. In fact, other measures had been put in place between the 1950s and 1970s to address this crucial concern, but they were mainly limited to education and birth control. This being said, these last policies didn’t really bring a significant change in population trends, and the one-child family policy certainly remains the most extreme.
The Chinese population planning that was first put into practice in 1979 may sound pretty simple and straightforward: Families are to have only one child to comply with the law. Nevertheless, the matter proved to be much more complex and intricate than this. While the one-child policy was the universal law, there were some exceptions introduced that allowed families to have more than one child in very specific cases. These mostly concerned families that were part of an ethnic minority group or whose first child was born with a handicap. Other exceptions included allowing for more than one child if the family’s first kid was a daughter or they lived in rural areas.
It’s important to note that many of these exceptions conceded by the Communist Party were directly related to the difficulty in enforcing the policy in rural areas. In less developed and rural areas, families often relied on their children for labor power, meaning that implementing the one-child policy required a larger social change than needed in urban areas. Additionally, rural families were harder to monitor.
The implementation patterns and specific exceptions regarding the policy were not solely connected to factors such as the rural/urban divide or ethnicity but were also deeply linked to cultural and political factors. As mentioned, exceptions were made for families if their first-born was a girl. Gender is a deeply cultural component in China, where sons were much more wanted and preferred than daughters, who were instead regarded as second-rate and more “unwanted” children.
Although gender may seem to be a less obvious element of China’s one-child policy, it was a crucial component. Not only did this cultural gender preference cause a large demographic imbalance between boys and girls, but it also led to phenomena like mass adoptions and even infanticides of baby girls. The government has also occasionally contributed to unethical and extreme measures by carrying out forced abortions and sterilisations in order to make families comply with the policy.
The norms related to this population planning had, in addition to the implications briefly explained above, other consequences that are often underestimated.
The country’s important difference between the number of boys and girls has, in fact, later turned into a critical demographic gap that has profoundly impacted the labour market and beyond. This has resulted in what can be described as the generation of “missing women“, as men greatly outnumber women. Upon reaching adulthood, many men are left without a partner due to this fact—an issue that continues to this day and is a direct effect from this very policy.
The one-child policy, which reigned in the country for more than 30 years, has also resulted in the development of an entire generation of children—who are now also adults —that do not appear in Chinese state records. People who fall into this group are popularly called “Heihaizi“, China’s “black children” who could not obtain a hukou— an official household registration. Such children were primarily second-born or later children who, upon birth, had no recognized right to exist due to this family planning policy.
Predicting and analyzing exactly how many Heihaizi exist is difficult, in fact, investigations on this topic are very complex, and it is challenging to find accurate numerical data. Because of this, research on this subject is very restricted. However, the amount of Heihaizi is thought to number more than ten million.
For the millions of Heihaizi, this administrative hole causes devastating consequences. They can’t access regular public services such as healthcare, get legally married, or even use public transportation. Moreover, they can’t go to school and get a formal education as normal citizens, and when they become adults, they can’t legally get a job.
Even in the case that families would want to regularize their Heihaizi’s administrative status and obtain a hukou registration, the cost to do so is often too prohibitive for them. This aspect has additionally highlighted economic and social disparities, as wealthier and more affluent families have been able to circumvent the norm by paying the fee for a hukou.
Not registered Heihaizi, therefore, end up being forced to stay away from society and even public spaces, spending most of their time confined to exclusively familiar spaces.
Although the one-child policy has been lifted for nearly a decade, the aftermath is widely felt today. The aging population is a critical reality of today’s post-family planning in China which is deeply impacting healthcare, the work landscape, and the general economic status of the country. Rural and low-income areas are also still affected as the policy significantly decreased resources in critical areas.
Moreover, despite the promises of the Chinese Communist Party, a great number of people have not yet been able to obtain official registration. The fines to be paid by Heihaizi and their families are still very high, and acquiring the documents necessary for a life in the open still seems to be a utopia for many.
By Sofia Bartolini
February 18, 2025
